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Abstract 
 
In Islām where God is established at the centre of grand ontological system of the worldview, the meaning and purpose of responsibility (taklīf) is clear from 
where it is derived. The responsibility is solely derived from God, and it is addressed exclusively to a natural person, the man. However, the meaning and 
purpose of responsibility has been going a debate in the contemporary discourse where the contemporary jurists have discussed the responsibility is 
extended its meaning to a non-human being or non-man, such as corporation, under the notion of the doctrine of dhimmah (substratum of responsibility). 
This study intends to clarify their claim by investigating the origin and development of the dhimmah which are in the discussion of the early legal theorists 
(uṣūliyyūn). A semantic analysis of the term dhimmah and its related key terms indicate that dhimmah is truly a God‟s exclusive endowment for a man, and 
not for other entities other than man. In addition, dhimmah refers to the original covenant that man‟s soul has sealed with God during the Primordial 
Covenant (mithāq). The findings further indicate a new hierarchy of responsibility of a man vis-à-vis the corporation can be established, where the former is 
derived from religion, while the later is from the state. This study will provide a philosophical and metaphysical framework in legal theory in Islām which is 
currently lacking, and can be of benefit for the students of legal theory as well as philosophy of ethics..   
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1.0 RESEARCH BACKGROUND 
 
Taklīf is a term that bears theological and legal vocabulary denoting the fact of an imposition on the part of God‟s obligations on His 
creatures, for them to subject to the Law. This obligations, nevertheless, is directed to none other than by man, a human being or a natural 
person, which is known in Islamic legal term as mukallaf. In the Qur‟ān, taklīf is mentioned on six times, though in a different expression, 
to express that Allah does not require of anyone to uphold the responsibility what is beyond his capacity (wus‘) (lā yukallifu illāhu nafsān 
illā wus‘ahā).  
The discourse on taklīf was discussed in the domain of theology and legal in the discourse between the theologians such as al-
Asha‟arī, al-Mātūrīdī, and the Mu„tazilī, as well as all the Islamic legal madhāhib. In the domain of theology, D. Gimaret highlights that 
the existence of taklīf raises three fundamental questions; firstly, how do we know the obligations which God imposes on us. Secondly, 
why does God impose obligation on us. Thirdly, can God oblige man to do the impossible? All these three questions have been thoroughly 
debated between the Ash„ārī school and Mu„tazilah school. On the question how do we know God obliges us, according to Mu„tazilah, it is 
known by reason (al-‘aql) and revelation (sam‘ or wahỵ). Through reason, man knows to respect elders, to pay debt, to follow the rules etc. 
Whereas through revelation, the obligations are more specific such as the obligation to perform the five daily prayers, to perform fasting 
during Ramaḍān and so forth. Mātūrīdīs‟ view is identical toward this. However, Ash„ārī is of the view that everything is known through 
revelation, and because of it, God then will reward or punish accordingly.  
Given the historical discussion in the foregoing, it can be concluded the Asha„ārī as well as the Mātūrīdī have established the ahl 
sunnah wa al-jamā‘ah‟s position on the question of taklīf. Now it is in the field of legal the question of taklīf has been challenged to 
another level—in light of the knowledge progression permeated by alien concepts and terms. The question of takkif  is now being extended 
to non-human which is the „corporation‟. 
 
 
2.0 PURPOSE OF THE STUDY 
 
Contemporary jurists namely Abdur Rahman, Ahmad Hassan, Anas Zarqa, Taqi Usmani, Mahdaa Zahraa, and many others who follow 
them, argue that Islam acknowledges „legal person‟, therefore, legal person entity known as „corporation‟ possess legal responsibility, 
dhimmah. The „corporation‟ is defined as an association or aggregation of people in a company constituted as an artificial „legal person‟ 
quite separate and distinct from the people who may form its membership. It is distinguished by a number of characteristics that make it a 
more flexible instrument for large-scale economic activity, particularly for the purpose of raising large sums of capital investment.  
Among its chief features are; (i) limited liability, meaning the capital suppliers are not subject to losses greater than the amount of 
their investment; (ii) transferability of shares, whereby rights in the enterprise may be transferred readily from one investor to another 
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without reconstituting the organization under law; (iii) juridical personality, meaning the corporation itself as a fictive “person” has legal 
standing and may thus sue and be sued, may take contracts, and may hold property in a common name; and (iv) indefinite duration, 
whereby the life of the corporation may extend beyond the participation of any incorporators.  
By virtue of dhimmah, it allows the corporation to have some responsibilities, such as buying and selling properties, owning 
properties, and sue and to be sued in the court under its own name. It is even debated that the entity like „Islamic banking‟ which is 
established under the „corporation‟ should pay zakat or not, because the entity acquires profits annually that entitle them to the zakat 
obligation, like the natural person whom their wealth has reached its ḥawl (period of wealth) and eligible to pay zakat.  
Given the perplexity on the issue, it is imperative to clarify our position based on the established definition of dhimmah as 
expounded especially by the early legal theorists (al-uṣūliyyūn) because they were the group of scholars who immensely discussed it. 
 
 
3.0 LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Several studies have been made on the earliest discussion pertaining to legal person. The issue of legal person was first brought in the 
corpus of modern Islamic intellectual discourse by Abdur Rahim (d. 1952). He coins the artificial person under the chapter of ahlīyyah, 
which is for the first time in modern literatures of uṣūl al-fiqh written in English the term artificial person is incorporated and mentioned. 
For the sake of clarity and comprehension, his statement is fully quoted as follows; 
 
It may be doubted whether the earlier jurists would recognize an artificial or juristic person. The State or community is 
regarded by them as holding and exercising the rights of God on His behalf through the Imām. Similarly the deceased is 
spoken of as having rights and obligations and not his estate, for the law deals both with a man‟s spiritual and worldly 
rights and obligations and even the worldly rights and obligations of a person cannot be said to be altogether lost on his 
death, inasmuch as he is entitled to have his funeral expenses and his debts and other obligations discharged out of the 
estate. But later jurists seem inclined to recognize an artificial person, for instance, they would allow a gift to be made 
directly to a mosque, while the ancient doctors would require the intervention of a trustee. 
 
From Rahim’s brief remark on the artificial person, there is nothing much could be deciphered on his thought about it. He does not 
elucidate further what the problem is possibly arised from the legitimation of legal person in Islām. However, he has opened a new 
intellectual vista of the Muslim scholars on the issue of legal person.  
Ahmad Hassan is of the view that the Muslim jurists do not recognize the legal person which he terms it in Arabic as shakhṣ ma‘nawī 
or ‘itibārī, on the basis that the legal capacity which is dhimmah implies intelligence. For him, the legal person is devoid of dhimmah. 
However, this is the theoretical position of the Muslims jurists as Hassan claims. It appears, according to him, the practical position is 
different from the theoretical, because the Muslim jurists do apparently recognize the legal person. For example, the state or community 
hold certain rights that they are allowed to receive a gift, a bequest, or a religious endowment to be made directly to a mosque, religious 
seminary, sanctuary, hospital, and similar other public institutions. Bayt al-māl for instance, can inherit the property of the deceased. He 
concludes by referring to those examples, that the Muslim jurists do recognize legal capacity for the natural man as well as the legal 
person.   
Taqi Usmani argues that the legal person or juridicial person is accepted in Sharī‘ah, despite its fictitious entity, because it is treated 
as natural person. If a person deceased insolvent, according to Islamic law, his creditors have no claim except to the extent of the assets he 
has left behind. However if the liabilities are exceed his assets, the creditor cannot claim from his heirs or relatives and certainly the 
creditors will suffer. Taqi argues there is a logical consequence of accepting juridicial person akin to natural person, because they are both 
ceteris paribus; whereby if the juridicial person is accepted on the basis that it is equivalent to natural person, ipso facto the concept of 
limited liability that is being practiced to companies or institutions, which they are established under the concept of legal person, is also 
acceptable. There are other scholars who follow the same line of argument, to mention some of them, Mahdi Zahraa, and Alī Muḥy al-Dīn 
al-Qurrah Dāghī. 
 
 
4.0 METHODOLOGY 
 
A semantic analysis of the term dhimmah and its related key terms is employed to understand the meaning of it. Taklīf is derived from the 
verbal noun of kallafa. It is said “kallaftu al-rajulu” (I assigned [something] to the man). It means, “I ordered something that is difficult for 
him” (ayy amarahu bimā yasyuqqu ‘alayhi). Legally, taklīf is defined by the majority of the jurists as the requiring (ilzām) of an action in 
which is difficulty and trouble. In Qur‟ān the expression to denote takkif  is used in the form of action, nukallif, yukallif, tukallafu as well as 
noun, al-mutakallifīn. 
As for the term dhimmah, linguistically it means a covenant, a guarantee, or a security. Technically, according to Wahbah Zuhaylī it 
is a collection of rights for a person and whatever debts from him or her (majmū‘ mā li al-shakhṣ min ḥuqūq wa mā ‘alayhi min iltizāmāt). 
It means that dhimmah is something that appears in the form of the person‟s wealth as for him or her to settle the debts (anna dhimmah 
tataṣawwar fī ṣūrah māl li al-shakhṣ ṣāliḥ li wafā’ al-duyūn). Thus, dhimmah is the understanding of it (mafhūmihā), whereas the 
underlying corporeal is the person‟s wealth. He is also of the view that this definition is close to the jurists‟ definition whom has given a 
precise definition that dhimmah is the substratum of the responsibility (maḥal).  
The concept of dhimmah was developed by the fuqahā’. This is according to al-Taftazānī in his al-Talwīḥ that he says, “dhimmah is 
something that has no meaning and Sharī‘ah does not require it, it is indeed an invention of the jurists as to justify the religious 
responsibility upon the mukallaf (anna al-dhimmah amr lā ma‘na lahu wa lā ḥājah ilayhi fī al-shar‘ wa innahu min mukhtari‘āt al-fuqahā’ 
yu‘abbirūna ‘an wujūb al-ḥukm ‘alā al-mukallaf). Before the time of al-Taftazānī‟, it is found that among the earliest record that dhimmah 
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was discussed by the fuqahā’ in relation to the responsibility (taklīf) is found in the work of al-Sarakhsī, al-Bazdawī and his commentary 
by „Alā al-Dīn. Al-Sarakhsī‟s contemporary, Muḥammad „Alī al-Tahānāwī (d. 1158), a Ḥanafī jurist and lexicography has recorded in his 
celebrated scientific and technical dictionary Kasyhāf Iṣṭilāḥāt al-Funūn wa al-‘Ulūm that he derived the explanation of the dhimmah from 
al-Talwīh and its glossaries by al-Fāḍil al-Chelebi and al-Barjandī in the Chapter of al-Kafālah (Guarantee).  
Al-Jurjānī has given a scientific and succinct definition of dhimmah. He uses the term dhimmah ṣāliḥah, which literally means al-
‘ahd, the similar definition held by most scholars. However, the technical definition of it, he classifies dhimmah into two aspects, either 
dhimmah as an attribute (ṣifat), or dhimmah as an essence (dhāt). 
On being an attribute, dhimmah is like a quality that owned by man that it is something outside of man. For example, if dhimmah is 
to be understood as an agreement or covenant (al-‘ahd), therefore, for those who against the rules or regulation, or the obligation, 
therefore, these people require some sort of covenant to bind them. On being an essence, dhimmah is an innate quality that endowed by 
God to all persons. This spiritual quality is already innate inside of the human being, so that they are obliged to adhere and follow God‟s 
obligations. According to al-Jurjānī, most jurists hold by this view.  
Al-Jurjānī‟s definition is predominantly derived from the Ḥanafī‟s school of law. It can be seen from the term dhimmah ṣāliḥah he 
used. It is originally introduced by al-Sarakhī and al-Bazdawi, because it could not be found such term in the Shāfī„i, Mālikī, and even 
Ḥanbalī‟s works. Hence, it can be deduced here that dhimmah has two aspects, an attribute or an essence.  
In contemporary mu‘jam, Sa„dī Abū Jayb in al-Qāmūs al-Fiqhīyyah Lughatan wa Iṣṭilāhān, finds that dhimmah has six meanings; i) 
the essence and the self (al-dhāt wa al-nafs), because both of these are the container or substratum, or capacity of the dhimmah; ii) 
undertaking (al-‘ahd); iii) peace (al-amān), iv) the reconciliation and peacefulness contract (‘aqd al-ṣulḥ wa al-muhādanah); v) guarantee 
(al-kafālah); vi) truth (al-ḥaqq) and sovereignity (al-ḥurmah). 
Therefore, it is important to distinguish the difference between taklīf and dhimmah. Taklīf is general (‘ām), because it comprises of 
ahlīyah al-wujūb and ahlīyah al-adā’. It is noted by the jurists (fuqahā’) that the rules of taklīf and ahlīyah is discussed in the Chapter of 
Prohibition (bāb al-ḥijr), while the legal theorists (uṣūliyyūn) discuss it in the four principle of ruling; the Lawgiver (al-Ḥākim), the Law 
(al-Ḥukm), the Subject Matter or the person who is obliged (al-Maḥkūm ‘Alayhi), and the Object or action (al-Maḥkūm Bihi). Abū Ḥafṣ 
„Umar al-Nasafī relates the dhimmah under the discussion of Kitāb al-Siyar which means an undertaking (‘ahd). 
Dhimmah, on the other hand, is particular (khuṣūṣ) because it deals with pre-requisite aspect of the responsibility.  This is in the 
sense of the root of dhimmah and its relation to the Primordial Covenant that can be traced in many earlier literatures on Islamic 
jurisprudence. However, the modern literatures as indicated in the work of Mawṣū‘ah al-Fiqhīyyah, Hashim Kamali, „Abd al-Karīm 
Zaydān, Mohamad Akram Laldin, Anwar Ahmad Qadri, just to mention some of them, unfortunately does not point dhimmah to the 
original covenant. This is with the exception of some of the works by Wahbah Zuhaylī, Abū Zahrah, and Imran Ahsan Khan Nyazee. They 
mention the origin of dhimmah, but it was brief. It is wondering why the discussion of dhimmah is not thoroughly explicated in the 
contemporary works of uṣūl al-fiqh, compared to the early works. The possible explanation of this can be understood as what Wael Hallaq 
has observed, when he argues that the nature of fiqh is primarily to arrive at certain legal judgement. Therefore any theological deliberation 
is not considered as vital as it should be. 
 
 
5.0 RESEARCH FINDINGS 
 
We argue in the above based on al-Taftazānī‟s remark that dhimmah was an invention of the early fuqahā’. This argument can imply that 
dhimmah is a social and mental construction that the jurists had used their imagination to come out with a concept of dhimmah. This line of 
thinking is exactly of the same argument by the secular social scientist, like Peter L. Berger & Thomas Luckmann, who claim that reality is 
socially constructed. “Reality”, according to them, is defined as a phenomenology which is independent from the control of human being, 
and it is organized around the “here” of man‟s body and the “now” of man‟s present. Man, according to the authors, and its process of 
becoming man takes place in an inter-relationship with the environment. It means that the environment defines the nature of man, and 
man‟s acquisition of knowledge predominantly coming from the external events which is the circumstances occur outside of man. 
Therefore, as for the authors, “knowledge”, either valid or not valid, which produced by the society must be accepted as reality. 
The problem of this idea is pointed by al-Attas in his book, Prolegomena to the Metaphysics of Islām that the reality in the 
worldview of Islām “is not formed merely by the gathering together of various cultural objects, values and phenomena into artificial 
coherence.” The notion of artificial coherence rightly pointed to this idea because the nature of its worldview is not natural, but an 
amalgamation of various cultural objects, values and phenomena. 
On the other hand, we argue that this invention by the jurists is a creative one profoundly based on the Qur‟ānic verses, and nothing 
is contradictory. It connotes an agreement that the soul has sealed since the Primordial Covenant (mithāq). It existed as the substratum of 
the responsibility which God has endowed to a sane and sound man. The scholars collectively and firmly base their argument based on the 
Quranic verse; “Waiz akhaza rabbuka min banī „Adām min zuhūrihim zurriyatahum wa ashhaduhum „alā anfusihim alastu birabbikum. 
Qālū balā shahidnā…” (And [mention] when your Lord took from the children of Adam—from their loins—their descendants and made 
them testify of themselves, [saying to them], "Am I not your Lord?" They said, "Yes, we have testified." [This]—lest you should say on the 
day of Resurrection, "Indeed, we were of this unaware"). 
The Covenant marks the key important event in defining the religion of Islām and the root of the worldview of the Muslims. This is 
what al-Attas has observed and expounded that the Covenant defines the identity of the Muslims and the religion that the Muslims should 
follow. It is also the origin and the purpose of their life in the world and hereafter, and the sources of knowledge of reality of things. He 
says:  
 
...this Covenant is of an essential nature; it is the starting point in the Islamic concept of religion, and is the dominant 
element in all other Islamic concepts bound up with it, such as those of freedom and responsibility, of justice, of 
knowledge, of virtue, of brotherhood,; of the role and character of the individual and the society and of their mutual 
identity in the framework of the state and of collective life.  
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In Henry Corbin‟s words, “the religious conscience of Islam is centered upon a fact of meta-history”, which he refers to the 
Primordial Covenant (yam al-mithāq). According to Shimmel, here is the starting point for the soul‟s understanding of free will and 
predestination, of election and acceptance, of God‟s eternal power, and man‟s loving response and promise. 
The early uṣūliyyūn, Al-Sarakhsī (d. 483/1090), a Ḥanafī jurist, expresses the term dhimmah ṣāliḥah to denote the place or 
substratum (maḥal) where the religious obligation is endowed to a sound human being or man during the Primordial Covenant. It is the 
dhimmah ṣāliḥah that live inside the soul of the man legitimates the obligation received by God. His contemporary, al-Bazdāwī (d. 
493/1100) also points the dhimmah to the Primordial Covenant. His commentator, „Alā‟ al-Dīn al-Bukhārī in Kasyf al-Asrār, makes a 
thorough deliberation on the Covenant. He argues that the ahliȳah al-wujūb (legal capacity) is not legitimate except by possessing the 
dhimmah ṣāliḥah. This dhimmah ṣāliḥah is an exclusive quality that man posses, not the other creatures. He further argues that the 
majority of jurists (fuqahā’) establish the position, and those who disagree with it, they will against the majority‟s decision. Here the 
majority of jurists are particulary the Ḥanafī‟s jurists because the other jurists from other madhdhab did not clearly delineate their position. 
It is based on Qāḍī Abū Zayd that dhimmah is a covenant with God, and when Allah created man, he or she was endowed with a place of 
trust in his or her soul, which is the intellect (‘aql) and dhimmah. By virtue of the two qualities, man is then entitled of his or her rights, 
freedom and responsibility.  
Al-Taftāzānī (d. 793/1390) elucidates further that the pre-requisite of the people who is given the responsibility (al-maḥkūm ‘alayhi) 
is the intellect (‘aql). Without intellect, neither obligation nor responsibility can be granted. It is intellect, together with dhimmah that Allah 
places these two qualities in man upon creation as a trust and sign of nobility. Through intellect, man is distinguished his or her creation 
from other beings. Upon commenting on the intellect, he incorporates the philosophical argument on the degrees of intellect as to support 
his argument. His explication of dhimmah and its relation to the intellect is a novel argument, which should be understood as the 
culmination of the intellectual tradition of his predecessors, such as al-Sarakhsī and al-Bazdāwī.  
Commenting on the people of being given the responsibility (al-mukallaf), al-Taftāzānī deliberates further in his commentary of 
Imām Nawāwī‟s Arbā‘īn al-Āḥādith, that those people are the people who posses sound intellect and sane (al-‘uqalā’ al-bālighīn). Of 
these two criteria, intellect (‘aql) is the place where the responsibility (taklīf) is dependent. Without which, the responsibility is not eligible 
for whom their intellect is not sound.  
If dhimmah is considered apriori or ḍārūrī (self-evident knowledge), would that mean that man knows already the responsibility that 
is carried out? It should be. Because man is given intellect to contemplate their existence; the origin of their life, and the ultimate purpose 
and destiny of their life. All these cannot be obtained merely by speculation or rumours, but definitely through revelation and true reports 
by the Messenger of God.  
Based on the foregoing discussion, it sufficiently shows that the discussion of taklīf and dhimmah by the early uṣūliyyūn were 
incredibly thorough and it is linked to the origin of man (insān) and intellect (‘aql). Definitely whatever terms that are related with 
dhimmah such as insān and ‘aql, all their meanings are projecting into a single coherent reality that is established in the tradition of Islām. 
It is not to say that the terms are taken arbitrarily. Dhimmah, if it is profoundly linked to the theological, metaphysical and legal domain, it 
can provide a sound and stable philosophy of ethics to the mankind. This argument which follow the deducing approach-—which 
reasoning by necessity—establishes the fact that dhimmah is only meant for a normal sane and sound person. It, therefore, denies the 
contemporary jurists‟ argument that non-person entity such as „corporation‟ also possess dhimmah. However, some of them modifies the 
concept by term it as dhimmah mu‘amalah—to denote the dhimmah is restricted to commercial purposes only—which to some extent is 
acceptable. By virtue of this, we can agree with Jurjānī‟s definition of dhimmah that it contains two aspects, it could be an attribute of a 
man and at the same time it could be an essence itself.  
 
 
6.0 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
 
The findings of the study will be able to provide an insightful legal and ethical framework on the meaning and purpose of responsibility in 
Islām in the contemporary days. Even though the findings are primarily based on the textual analysis of the term based on the writings of 
early scholars of Islām, it establishes the fact that man is a special creation that Allah has given in man a dhimmah and intellect (‘aql) to 
perform his religious and worldly duty. In light of the Fourth Industrial Revolution discourse that is pervasively debated, the discussion of 
dhimmah is furthermore extremely important as the basis of ethical framework. It is already a question that being discussed; can electronic 
agents like robot be granted legal personality under Law? If it is to be entertained as having the legal personality and possessing dhimmah, 
it will open a floodgate of unimaginable issues such as the determination of what is the meaning of responsibility? Who should be liable, is 
it the creator of the robot or the robot itself? How God could reward or punish if the responsibility is vague? And many sorts of questions. 
This will tremendously change the nature of responsibilities and subsequently the framework of ethics in the near future. That is the reason 
the study of dhimmah is extremely important. 
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